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Self-determination as non-domination
Ideals applied to Palestine/Israel
IRIS MARION YOUNG
University of Chicago
ABSTRACT This article conceptualizes self-determination as non-domination,
and distinguishes this from the more standard concept of self-determination as non-
interference. Principles of non-domination imply relationships between self-
determining units and the joint regulation of such relationships. To understand the
application of this model, I suggest that we should assume the situation and claims
of indigenous people as the norm rather than the exception. This model of self-
determination implies federalism as a mode of being together with other self-
determining units. Many discussions of federalism, however, assume that
autonomous units are large, homogeneously occupied, contiguous territories.
Suspending this assumption opens ways of conceiving federal relations as more
local, plural, and horizontal. I suggest that this model of self-determination as non-
domination and the patchwork federalism it sometimes implies may enable a vision
of Israeli Jews and Palestinians dwelling peacefully together in bi-national
federation.
KEYWORDS federalism ● indigenous peoples ● Palestinians
Few political commentators today think that every distinct people can and
should have a sovereign state exclusively of its own. Yet writings on the self-
determination of peoples for the most part continue to assume a paradigm
of self-determination that mirrors the sovereign state. In this paradigm, a
self-determining people dwells together in a relatively large territory in
which only members of their group reside, and this homogenous territory
is contiguous and bounded; the self-determining people exercise strong self-
government rights over this territory. This autonomous region may not be
sovereign, but rather may stand in formalized relation to a larger state. This
paradigm of self-determination has guided many political events and
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international interventions of the last quarter century – from the ethnic
cleansings of Croatia and Bosnia to the United Nations protectorates of
Kosovo and East Timor. Acting under this paradigm of self-determination
sometimes brings as much justice as there can be under the circumstances.
Where groups with conflicting claims to exclusive sovereignty over a terri-
tory reside side-by-side within that territory, however, as in Northern
Ireland or the republics of the former Yugoslavia, adhering to this paradigm
tends to produce injustice and perpetuate cycles of violence.
One reason for such a consequence lies in the lack of correspondence
between this model of self-determination as self-government over a
homogeneously occupied large contiguous bounded territory, on the one
hand, and the actual situation of conflicting peoples, on the other. Most
sizeable territories are inhabited by several peoples who consider them-
selves distinct, and they are usually dispersed across these territories in
smaller enclaves, towns, villages or neighborhoods next to towns or
neighborhoods in which members of groups from which they differentiate
themselves reside.
Most peoples regard themselves as distinct from other peoples, that is,
dwell in proximity to others from whom they differentiate themselves.
The form of such differentiation, moreover, is often fluid, and there are
often at least some individuals who are ‘hybrid’ in the sense that they
identify with multiple groups. Rather than base a conception of self-
determination on the assumption that peoples are separate or separable,
then, it behooves those of us interested in peace and justice to conceptual-
ize self-determination as compatible with the fact that groups often dwell
together in territories; for this reason they often have shared problems, and
the activities of those in one group often affect the possibilities of action for
others.
In this article I offer a conception of self-determination as compatible
with being ‘together-in-difference.’1 Whereas the more standard concept
assumes self-determination as non-interference, I conceptualize self-
determination as non-domination. Principles of non-domination imply
relationships between self-determining units and the joint regulation of
such relationships. To understand the application of this model, I suggest
that we should assume the situation and claims of indigenous people as the
norm rather than the exception. This model of self-determination implies
federalism as a mode of being together with other self-determining units.
Many discussions of federalism, however, assume that autonomous units
are large, homogeneously occupied, contiguous territories. Suspending this
assumption opens ways of conceiving federal relations as more local, plural,
and horizontal.
To illustrate how this concept of self-determination might contribute to
imagining alternatives in a situation of group political conflict, I apply the
analysis to the situation of Palestine/Israel. I suggest that a vision of
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dispersed Jewish and Palestinian jurisdictions, organized in a federal system
whose constitution minimizes the possibility of domination may have some
advantages over other visions of the region’s future. The main purpose of
this example is not to make concrete proposals for moving the
Palestinian–Israeli conflict toward just peace. The main purpose is to show
how the conception of self-determination I propose might fuel the political
imagination anywhere that groups are interspersed with one another but
claiming exclusive rights to sovereignty over a territory.
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AS PARADIGMATIC
If we refocus the lens for looking at the normative requirements of self-
determination from assuming a large homogenously concentrated people
in a relatively large contiguous bounded territory, to understanding distinct
peoples as more dispersed and mixed geographically alongside one another,
then it is useful to take the claims of indigenous people for self-
determination as paradigmatic rather than exceptional. The claims of
indigenous people for self-determination have, in the last quarter century,
achieved considerable legitimacy in the international community as well as
in the domestic politics of many states. Despite the effort of some states to
implement policies aimed to accommodate indigenous claims for self-
determination, almost no indigenous people anywhere in the world believe
they have achieved full self-determination. In an apparent paradox,
however, almost no indigenous people take as their political goal secession
from the state which now claims jurisdiction over them to establish their
own sovereign state. I suggest that if we articulate a concept of self-
determination that corresponds to the aspirations of most indigenous
people, that this concept can be useful more generally to considering
political conflicts that involve peoples who perceive themselves as distinct,
but who dwell side-by-side or are interspersed over contiguous lands. Such
a concept of self-determination is likely to be more useful under such
circumstances, which describe many conflicts in the world, than is the idea
of a separate contiguous bounded territory over which the self-determining
people has exclusive control.2
Other features of the situation and claims of indigenous people make
this a useful paradigm for theorizing self-determination. In every place
where the category of indigenous is relatively uncontested, particularly in
North and South America, Australia and New Zealand, the indigenous
people have suffered histories of serious injustice and domination under
colonialism. In most of these places, indigenous people as a group are
among the least well off in the society, and continue to suffer discrimination
and exploitation. Colonialist and modernist domination have disrupted the
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traditional languages and cultural practices of many of these groups, but
they nevertheless managed to retain enough of them to engage in projects
of cultural renewal when repression lessened. The claims to self-
determination that indigenous people make gain some of their legitimacy
in the eyes of others from a judgment that this history of domination was
wrong and that the current deprived status of most indigenous people, both
as individuals and groups, requires their own autonomy to be ameliorated.
Almost nowhere do indigenous people form a territorially concentrated
large group. Partly because of traditional nomadic or village band life, and
partly because of colonial policies of creating reserves, indigenous people
usually live dispersed in relatively small clusters across the territory of the
nation state to which they are currently related. Their national identity,
moreover, is usually defined in terms of these traditional bands which
understand themselves as related to particular locales. Maori in New
Zealand, First Nations in Canada, Aboriginals in Australia, or Indians in
the USA are all political categories which have evolved as indigenous
people politically organize with one another in order to protest and engage
with the white settler state. In each case, the peoples who claim self-
determination for themselves are smaller, dispersed local groups who
usually dwell alongside non-indigenous.
Some theorists of nationalism and multiculturalism try to mitigate
possible conflict between the claim of distinct peoples for self-
determination and the desire of states to maintain control over activities in
a territory by arguing that nationalist claims are best recognized through
systems of cultural autonomy. On this view, liberal nationalism consists in
guaranteeing that national minorities have governing power over the
generation, expression, and transmission of national culture – ability to
speak their own language without suffering disadvantage, freedom of
religion and self-government over religious institutions, the constitution of
autonomous schools, and the like.3 On this view of minority rights, self-
determination claims do not need to involve control over land and
resources. Almost no indigenous people think that institutions of cultural
autonomy are sufficient to give them self-determination, important as these
are. Their claims necessarily involve control over land and resources, not
only because their identities are tied to place, but also because they judge
that their material improvement as individuals and groups requires having
land and resources about which they as a group make autonomous
decisions.4
Indigenous peoples’ claims for self-determination thus raise the follow-
ing questions. What does it mean for groups to be self-determining but not
on the model of nation-state sovereignty? How can groups that are rela-
tively small, and territorially dispersed among others who understand
themselves as belonging to different groups, be self-determining without
necessarily ruling over a large territory in which they are concentrated and
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from which they have the right to exclude others? How can such dispersed
self-determination be recognized, especially when the group requires
control over land and resources to be self-determining? How should
relations between these groups and the non-indigenous among whom they
dwell be conceived?
Let me note one final feature of the indigenous politics of self-
determination as it often plays out today. Indigenous claims for self-
determination often involve claims for redistribution or subsidy of their
governmental and social service institutions, and some states have taken
steps to respond to these claims. To be self-determining and for their people
to flourish, indigenous people generally insist that the states against which
they claim self-determination, and to some extent international institutions,
ought to enable the realization of their self-determination rights by at least
partly funding their governments and their government services, including
bureaucratic staff, equipment, schools, health services and similar public
services. Some non-indigenous in the affected states believe this is contra-
dictory: The indigenous people cannot both claim self-determination of
cultural expression and economic development and expect the wider
society to subsidize their government activities and services. Without such
support, however, in many cases the indigenous group would have little
means to exercise their rights of self-determination. Thus a final question
is: Is there a conception of self-determination in which such subsidy, where
needed, is coherent? While this set of questions arises most obviously in
connection with claims of indigenous people to self-determination, I
suggest that their answers can illuminate the normative meaning of self-
determination for most peoples.
Some Palestinian advocates think that their claims of justice might be
well furthered by trying to achieve recognition under international law as
indigenous people.5 I make no judgment about whether this is a worthy
political strategy, nor do I wish to take a position on whether Palestinians
qualify as indigenous under the current definition of international law.
I am suggesting, as I said above, that the indigenous paradigm is more
useful for exploring the question of what self-determination might mean
normatively for Palestinians than the nation-state sovereignty paradigm.
The situation of Palestinians now residing in Israel, as well as those residing
on the West Bank, in Gaza, in East Jerusalem, in Jordan, Syria and
Lebanon, has certain similarities with the situation of many indigenous
peoples. Many were forced to move during a process of colonization. Israeli
regions such as Galilee and the Negev contain predominantly Arab popu-
lations adjacent to and surrounded by Israeli Jewish state power and
development. Many Palestinians are concentrated in the Gaza strip,
surrounded by hostile forces and cut off from many material benefits and
freedom to move and associate. Other Palestinians are more dispersed,
living in relatively small villages across territories in the West Bank or Israel
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where Jews and other non-Palestinians live; or they dwell in neighborhoods
and enclaves in mixed cities such as Jerusalem, Tel Aviv or Haifa. Cultural
autonomy is an important part of a claim of Palestinian self-determination,
and many Palestinians lack cultural autonomy. Like indigenous people,
however, Palestinian claims to self-determination cannot be accommodated
without autonomy with respect to land and resources as well as culture. The
exercise of self-determination for Palestinians, finally, requires redistribu-
tive transfers to enable their governmental and social services.
To reiterate, I have discussed the situation and claims of groups referred
to as indigenous people because their situation and claims are often taken
to be anomalous in international relations. I invoke the example of indigen-
ous people to suggest that their situation and claims appear anomalous only
under the paradigm of self-determination as separate and exclusive nation-
state sovereignty. This paradigm has been coming under increasing strain
both because processes of globalization impinge on sovereignty from
without and group rights movements challenge singular sovereignty from
within. Thus I suggest that if we conceptualize a concept of self-
determination, which responds to the situation and claims of indigenous
people, such a concept might serve as a better general paradigm of self-
determination. In the two sections that follow, I propose such an alterna-
tive concept of self-determination and argue that it implies institutions of
horizontal federalism. Then in the final section I will return to the case of
Palestine/Israel, to show how this conception of self-determination might
guide institutional vision for the region.
T WO CONCEPTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Even though many theorists and political actors today question the idea
that the realistic response to most claims of nations or peoples to self-
determination is to establish a separate sovereign state for each people,
most writings on self-determination assume the model of state sovereignty
as their paradigm. I refer to this as the non-interference model of self-
determination.6 On this interpretation, for a group to be self-determining
means that it controls a sphere over which others have no authority. The
non-interference model makes a strong distinction between inside and
outside. The self-determining group dwells inside a single territorial juris-
diction over which self-governing institutions have sole authority. For the
group to be self-determining means primarily that outsiders do not inter-
fere with the decisions and actions made by those governing institutions
over what goes on inside the jurisdiction.
The non-interference model of self-determination is certainly plausible.
Autonomy, whether of an individual or a group, certainly means having the
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right to run one’s own affairs and to challenge others who try to run them
instead. There are, however, several drawbacks to the non-interference
model of self-determination. A major reason that groups seek self-
determination is to protect against domination by others. The non-
interference model fulfills the purpose only imperfectly, however, and
sometimes not at all. When enacted, this model protects against the direct
interference by an outside agent in the decisions and actions of an
autonomous unit. A non-interference model assumes that these auton-
omous units can be and are properly separate, and need have no interaction
other than what they voluntarily enter. As I noted earlier, however, in fact
the world’s peoples are often geographically mixed, or dwell in close
proximity to one another, within physical and social environments that
jointly affect them. The peoples who have or claim self-determination are
inevitably related to one another. They have numerous economic and social
interactions where each affects the others, and each risks being adversely
affected by actions of the others because of their relationship. Because
agents and groups are often closely related in common contexts where their
actions affect one another, and because they are often unequal in resources
or power, or both, some of the weaker units may be vulnerable to domi-
nation by more powerful units not because they directly interfere, but
because they determine conditions under which the weaker party is forced
to act.
Forms of domination such as this are common among supposedly
sovereign entities in the world today. Arguably, the USA stands in a
dominative relation to Mexico, for example, even though the USA only
infrequently tries to interfere in the internal processes of Mexican
sovereignty. The US government and private organizations based in the
USA are able to constrain options both of the Mexican government and
many private actors under its jurisdiction just because activities in each
society are interdependent, and because the power relationship between
the two societies is unequal in many respects.
The non-interference model of self-determination, moreover, does
nothing to protect insiders from domination by the governing institutions
or by other insiders. A concept of self-determination that means primarily
non-interference with the internal affairs of a sovereign government
implicitly allows for domination within, to the extent that it forbids
outsiders from interfering if they observe such internal domination. Some
contemporary human rights theorists worry, for example, that a strong non-
interference model of self-determination must turn a blind eye to traditions
and practices through which men dominate women.7 Inasmuch as most
autonomous jurisdictions contain ethnic minorities vulnerable to domi-
nation by majorities, moreover, a non-interference model of self-
determination implicitly gives such majorities license to dominate internal
minorities.
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Arguably, a pure non-interference concept of sovereignty has never
existed in practice. International law and practices of international
governance in the late 20th- and early 21st-century, moreover, increasingly
involve forms of transnational authority constraining the actions of
sovereign states and forms of negotiation and cooperation between entities
within different states. Both theorists and political actors in international
affairs nevertheless continue to take non-interference as the primary
meaning of the concept of self-determination.
I propose a different model of self-determination, one that puts the
objective of mutual respect and the avoidance of domination more at the
center. Self-determination means autonomy: the self-determining entity
should be able to set its own ends and be able to act toward their realiza-
tion, within the limits of respect for, and cooperation with, other agents
with whom one interacts and with whom one stands in relation. Conceived
as non-domination, self-determination entails a presumption of non-
interference.8 Prima facie, outside agents should stay out of the business
of self-determining units. Because some of these autonomous agents are
inevitably related to one another in wider contexts of shared environ-
ments, overlapping influence and effect, and in the way they define them-
selves, a conception of self-determination should take such relations into
account. When groups stand together in their difference they must be
mindful that sometimes their efforts to enact their own projects may have
potentially adverse effects on other agents. Outside agents who believe
that the actions of an autonomous agent affect them adversely can legiti-
mately make a claim on the affecting agent to have a right to negotiate
with them about the terms of their relations and the actions that may harm
them. Self-determining entities need to join a decision-making body to
work out procedures for adjudicating such claims and potential conflicts.
To the extent that self-determining units dwell together in common
environment, moreover, they are liable to face some common problems.
What it means to face such problems autonomously, then, is that they
have institutions through which they are able to discuss those shared
problems and decide on joint actions to address them. Within such insti-
tutions, self-determining entities ought to have equal status and mutual
respect.
The prima facie principle of non-interference in the internal jurisdiction
of a self-determining unit may be suspended, then, in order that the
common decisions of units be enacted to prevent domination by one of the
units of another. Non-interference is also suspended, moreover, in order to
prevent some members of a self-determining unit from dominating
members internally. The autonomous units who potentially can harm one
another by engaging in their own self-regarding activities should participate
in a process that decides when such intervention to prevent domination is
called for. Promoting self-determination as non-domination, finally,
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requires providing positive support for units that are weak or poorly
resourced, to a level that enables them meaningfully to pursue their way of
life, autonomy, and competence to interact and negotiate with other self-
determining units.
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IMPLICATIONS: HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM
Under circumstances where distinct peoples or units are spatially,
economically, and environmentally interdependent, self-determination as
non-domination requires relations of joint governance among self-
determining units. Under these circumstances, that is, self-determination as
non-domination entails federalism. Most generally, federalism designates a
system of ‘self-rule plus shared rule.’9 In principle, federalism is ‘an attempt
to find equilibrium between centripetal and centrifugal forces, between
conflicting needs for unity and diversity, for putting together and keeping
apart.’10
The claim that self-determination as non-domination entails federalism
means that self-determination isn’t yet realized by a people having a
jurisdiction of their own, but also requires having regulated relations with
other jurisdictions. Why does this understanding of self-determination
entail federalism? Because the people or unity claiming self-determination
dwells together with others – on lands together or next to each other, in a
common regional environment of relatively dense social and economic
interaction. As together, they sometimes face common problems. They are
economically interdependent on issues such as trade, the demand for labor,
the effects of production and finance on their people, and in the distribution
of resources and opportunities.
Even though interdependent in these and other ways, peoples that dwell
together are often unequal in their resource base, wealth, or capacity for
asserting their interests. All these factors underlie a potential for conflict
between the goals and interests of the units, and they also generate
efficiency needs for joint action to address the problems. If these mutually
affecting units do not have regulated means of settling conflict fairly; if they
do not have ways of preventing interdependence from becoming an
unequal dependence; or if they do not have mechanisms for ongoing
cooperation; then domination of some of the formally autonomous units by
another or others is likely to ensue. Federalism is the general name for
governance arrangements between self-governing entities in which they
participate together in such cooperative regulation. When one people from
one group live in the same territories as others, or when the groups are
close, self-governing units cannot be fully self-determining unless the
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differently defining peoples participate together in processes that regulate
their inevitable and in many ways involuntary relationship.
Federalism is a genus with several possible species. Both theoretical
literature about federalism and most existing federations operate with a
model influenced by the concept of self-determination as non-interference.
They assume that the units of a federation are each single relatively large
contiguous bounded territories. In most models of federalism, furthermore,
these self-governing units do not relate to one another directly, but rather
only through a central federal government in which each of them is
represented. The federal rules determine what the powers of the central
government are and what the federated units are. In most federal systems,
finally, the definition of the powers of each of the self-governing units is the
same. Each element of this typical model of federalism can be questioned
as necessary to, or most desirable for, a system of self-rule with shared
rule that can correspond to a concept of self-determination as non-
domination.
Asymmetry vs. symmetry
The last of the conditions I have mentioned has been brought into question
by proponents of asymmetrical federalism. A federation is symmetrical
when its constitution defines identical rights and powers for each of the
constituent units with relation to the central government and to one
another. The USA embodies a symmetrical federalism. Canada, on the
other hand, has been moving toward an asymmetrical federalism in which
the jurisdictional powers of Quebec differ in certain respects from those of
the other provinces. Given the historical, geographical or power relation-
ships between some federated units, there can be good reasons to define
their jurisdictional powers differently, and/or to define their relationships
differently from the federal governance processes. Some people believe
that asymmetrical federalism is inherently unfair because it departs from a
standard of formally equally treatment. Where there are differences of
culture, history, or power among federating units, however, an asymmetri-
cal federalism may in fact be more fair than a constitution that accords the
same rights and powers to each unit.
Horizontality vs. decentralization
Typically, systems called ‘federal’ consist of a constitutional center with
limited but overriding power over units that have no formal relation to one
another except through that center. Some theorists of federalism argue,
however, that this model falls short of the principles of federalism
altogether. Ferran Requejo argues that this model confuses federalism
with regional decentralization and/or the application of a principle of
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subsidiarity. On this basis he takes issue with the claim that the current
constitution of Spain is federalist, for at least two reasons: the distinct
national groups of the Basque country, Catalonia, and Galicia have the
same rights and powers as other autonomous units (symmetry), and the
federal government retains control over many important issues, such as
taxation, constitutional reform, and judiciary, with the regions implement-
ing directives from the center with some autonomy.11
Daniel Elazar distinguishes what he calls a ‘matrix’ model of federalism
from the more typical center–periphery model. The matrix model is more
complex than the center–autonomous locale model. It disperses authority
and power among units in networks of different relationships.12
We can conceive federal systems with both vertical and horizontal
relationships in potential federal systems. Any federal system will have
some rules and procedures that govern the relation of the units to the
federation in a vertical way. A common or central government needs to
implement a federal constitution and adjudicate disputes about its meaning
and application. Since many of the reasons for units to stand in ongoing
relationships of negotiation and cooperation concern promoting efficient
and fair economic relations between units, it is usually appropriate for the
federal government to regulate a common currency, and to regulate the
terms of inter-unit commerce, including labor markets and labor standards.
When groups reside next to, or are interspersed with, one another in a
geographic region, finally, they face a common set of environmental
conditions which require common regulation. A decentered asymmetrical
federalism perhaps need not involve a central authority in any issues
beyond these.
For many other issues, units can relate to one another directly without
invoking or going through a central federal government. This is what I
mean by a ‘horizontal’ dimension to federalism. Self-governing political
units have many reasons to relate to one another directly without going
through a center: to resolve some conflict between them that does not
concern other units, to work out joint ways of addressing shared problems,
to facilitate objectives each of whose realization affects some but not all
the others, and so on. Some federations might benefit from instituting
principles and procedures that make it easier for units to develop horizontal
authorities and agreements.13
Large contiguous territories vs. smaller discontiguous territories
Federated systems, finally, need not assume that the units of self-
determination are relatively large, contiguous bounded territories, as in, for
example, the German federation. Small units such as cities, towns and
neighborhoods can count as self-governing units that are nested within
federal constitutions which regulate their relationships with one another.
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Some urban theorists in the USA, for example, advocate forms of metro-
politan governance along lines of horizontal federalism between the dozens
or hundreds of jurisdictionally distinct municipalities in a metropolitan
region. Rather than bring these jurisdictions under a single centralized
authority that would override their local decisions, they call for regularized
systems of negotiation and cooperation between municipal units.14 I noted
above that the residential patterns of many multiethnic regional contexts
involve groups whose members reside in dispersed towns, villages or neigh-
borhoods surrounded by, or next to, towns and neighborhoods, the majority
of whose members identify with different groups. In keeping with these
facts, it is possible to conceive a unit jurisdictionally constituting a self-
determining people as itself not a contiguous territory, but rather a set of
discontiguous locales in between which lie locales that belong to other
self-determining jurisdictions.
APPLICATION TO PALESTINE/ISRAEL
I suggest that the distinction between self-determination as non-
interference and as non-domination, along with institutional possibilities of
federalism that follow from it, offers a framework for conceptualizing
institutional possibilities for the context of Palestine/Israel. Before I
delineate how, let me explain the status of such an account. As the title of
this article indicates, I offer non-domination as a normative ideal for
interpreting self-determination. Ideals sometimes guide thought and action
by jogging the political imagination away from unexamined assumptions,
and by enabling a critical distance from existing facts, so they can be better
evaluated. This is all I hope that the account below might do for those
thinking and working for justice and peace in Palestine/Israel. What I offer
is not a political program or an institutional design; this level of analysis is
more abstract than that required by institutional design. Much less can this
account be taken as a ‘peace plan’.
The most that I can claim for this application of the ideas laid out in
previous sections of this article is that it may help political actors both inside
and outside Palestine/Israel conceptually sort out alternatives among
institutional possibilities. The theoretical distinction between a non-
interference and a non-domination model of self-determination suggests
that there are three primary ways to conceptualize political institutions and
change in Palestine/Israel from the current situation of occupation and
resistance: (1) two separate sovereign states; (2) a single secular individualist
state for the region; (3) a federation of self-governing units. While the first
two each represent important normative principles, both have problems, I
suggest, that derive from their assumption of the paradigm of a unitary
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state. I will argue that the third alternative serves as a better ideal of self-
determination for both Palestinians and Israeli Jews under a paradigm of
non-domination.
Two separate sovereign states
The most commonly expressed vision of the future of the region today calls
for establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and perhaps
including East Jerusalem, though positions differ on this question. This
Palestinian state would exist independently of, and alongside, the state of
Israel, which will return to its pre-1967 borders. Ideally, the territory of each
state would have clear borders, and a contiguous territory, so that a citizen
of one need not cross the territory of the other in order to reach another
part of his or her own state. Some provision would have to be made for a
‘corridor’ between the West Bank and the Gaza strip for this ideal to be
approximated in Palestine. Each state would have sole jurisdiction over
what goes on within its territory, and the right to tell outsiders not to inter-
fere with its sovereign actions. Israel and the international community
would recognize the Palestinian state as sovereign, with the same status as
other sovereign states.
I support the establishment of a Palestinian state. Whatever the insti-
tutional arrangements that may be most just and desirable in the long term,
a necessary step toward those arrangements is that Palestinians in the
occupied territories, as well as many of those now in the Palestinian
diaspora, should exercise more self-government and have greater legal
authority over land and resources. Most articulations of the two-state
solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestinians, however, assume a
model of self-determination as non-interference, which implies being
separate. They tend to assume that each people can have sovereignty over
a territory of their own, where they can promote the economic develop-
ment and cultural expression of their distinct people, and that the
conditions of their self-determination can be fulfilled by asserting that
outsiders should not interfere with their internal business. This image of
clearly separate sovereign states relating to one another only as neighbors
and through formal bilateral agreements is hard to square, however, with
the existing reality that Palestinians and Jews dwell so thoroughly among
one another, and that the current terms of their relationships are
profoundly unequal.15
The two separate sovereign state image of the future of Palestine/Israel
does not adequately address the spatial togetherness of the two groups.
Palestinians dwell in Israel in towns or neighborhoods adjoining those of
Jews; currently hundreds of thousands of Jews live in settlements in the
occupied territories. The territories envisioned as belonging to each group,
especially to the Palestinians, are not contiguous, and the city of Jerusalem
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is a contested space claimed by both. Of course, these present facts result
from a history of domination and expropriation of Palestinian territory by
Israel. Nevertheless, they would be difficult to reverse entirely, and at this
stage a partial reversal could leave Palestinians even worse off. Recent
announcement of an Israeli policy of ‘disengagement’ from Palestinian
territories has prompted cries of outrage, among other reasons because
such an effort at separation by the more privileged party would leave
Palestinians imprisoned without opportunities for flourishing, rather than
self-determining.
Palestinians and Israelis are similarly affected by the natural environ-
ment of the region, its weather and shortage of water. They are also
economically interdependent, but on an unequal basis. Creating a Palestinian
state in the West Bank and Gaza, and declaring that state sovereign, which
is to say that it exercises a right of self-determination as non-interference,
does little to address the deep and unjust inequalities between Israel and
the Palestinians. Can a Palestinian state be viable when Israel continues to
dominate military and police power over lands adjacent to and separating
the Palestinian territories? Given existing inequalities of power and techni-
cal knowledge, how can a Palestinian state alongside Israel be assured of
fair access to water? Shouldn’t Palestinian workers be able to move freely
in the region to go to work, including into Israel? In order that the
Palestinian economy develop and the Israeli economy flourish, don’t
trade and investment opportunities need to be facilitated on a region-wide
basis?
The creation of a Palestinian state, furthermore, does not address the
situation and aspirations of Palestinians living in Israel, who comprise more
than one-fifth of its citizens. Unless they would be willing to move to a
Palestinian state outside Israel, which polls say most of them are not, having
the two states absolutely does not lift the burden of inequality and domi-
nation they currently suffer in Israel. Palestinian citizens of Israel suffer
many kinds of discrimination, and have limited freedom of association and
cultural expression. Some have had their lands taken by the state and their
houses demolished, and others suffer different indignities at the hands of
both the state and private organizations. Of course, demands should be
made on Israel to respect the rights of all its citizens, and Palestinian
citizens are not the only minorities arguably treated unfairly in Israeli
society. Because many Palestinian Israelis have or desire personal and
political connection with Palestinians now living in the occupied territories,
as well as with those living in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, Palestinian
institutions from which they are entirely separate sit poorly with their
aspirations for connection with the Palestinian project of self-
determination.16 In this connection, most articulations of a plan of two
separate states do not respond to the aspirations of Palestinians now living
outside either territory to return to those territories.
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A singular secular state for Palestine/Israel
We can imagine a completely different form of political institution for this
region, one that certainly recognizes that the peoples living in the region
now live closely among one another in many locales. There might be a
single political unit covering the territory that is now Israel along with the
territories Israel occupied in 1967, but one belonging to no particular
nationality or religious group. This single state would be secular and
individualist. All members would have equal and identical rights, and law
and social policy would give no recognition to groups.
A secular individualist state in what is now Palestine/Israel has been the
dream of many people who care about this conflict since before the
founding of Israel. With the establishment of a separate Palestinian state
apparently on hold, discussion of a singular secular individualist state has
revived to some extent.17
That all members of a polity should have equal civil and political rights
is a basic principle of morality and international law, and a secular
individualist state is arguably the most direct way to institutionalize that
principle. At least at this point in the history of conflict in the region,
however, this is a problematic alternative just because it recognizes only
individuals and gives no status to peoples. Some Jews, both inside and
outside Israel, find this suggestion an anathema because they understand it
as the elimination of Israel as a state for the Jewish people.18 Insofar as this
alternative gives no specific recognition to groups or to the aspirations of
peoples to self-determination, they are right. Peoples, such as the Jewish
people and the Palestinian people, have a legitimate claim for a social and
political means to govern themselves in their own ways and to enact public
expressions of their history and culture as a people. The humanist vision of
a secular individualist state conflicts with these goals. Each people has some
grounds for their fear of being oppressed as a group with such a nominally
neutral state, moreover – Jews because they would soon be a minority, and
Palestinians because Jews would begin with greater power, wealth and
privilege.
Bi-national federalism
The second of the above alternatives denies expression to the claim of a
people for institutional expression to self-determination. The first alterna-
tive recognizes claims of self-determination, but does so in an exclusionary
way that fails to respond to interdependence and relations of domination.
Institutions implementing an understanding of self-determination as non-
domination offer a third conceptual alternative. In this application, we
envision a distinct political unit or units for the Jewish people and the
Palestinian people. Each unit or set of units exercises political, cultural and
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local resource autonomy. As I imagine this alternative, it does not involve
two and only two units, one Palestinian and one Jewish; rather it imagines
a number of smaller and dispersed Palestinian- and Jewish-identified units,
as well as some that are identified only by locale. Citizens of each, however,
whatever their group affiliations, have equal civil and political rights
additionally within a system of shared rule in which the units participate.
The purpose of a federated level is to constitute and maintain regular
procedures through which units negotiate their ongoing relationships, in
order to limit the possibility of some dominating others and to promote the
benefits of cooperative action and economies of scale. Over the last 50 years
there have also been discussions about federal solutions for conflict in the
region, though most of these have presumed meanings of federalism which
I have brought into question in the previous section.
In the previous section, I put into question the image of federation that
assumes its units as large, contiguous territories each of which has the same
rights and powers. A federated system of Israeli and Palestinian jurisdic-
tions might be best envisioned also as challenging these assumptions. Some
alternative imaginings about Palestine/Israel propose shared rule over
Jerusalem, which would constitute a distinct jurisdiction with specific rights
and powers not symmetrical to, or falling under, the jurisdiction of either
the Israeli or Palestinian state.19 One articulation of this idea of a district
of Jerusalem envisions a metropolitan federation of local self-governing
districts peopled mostly by Jews or Palestinians, and each giving expression
to the self-determining desires of those peoples.20 A more general vision of
federation between Palestinian and Jewish units in the district of Palestine/
Israel cannot imagine simply a vertical relation between local and federal
institutions. Instead, locally self-governing towns or districts coming under
Palestinian jurisdiction would need to engage in relations of cooperation
and negotiation with neighboring local towns or districts coming under
Israeli jurisdiction.21 Such interspersed federated discontiguous local
districts would extend over the breadth of what is now Israel and the
occupied territories. Insofar as they might have direct relationships, they
would be enacting horizontal federalism of the sort I have discussed above.
Envisioning self-determining units as relatively small, the size of
municipalities or metropolitan areas, and horizontally related to other such
units, has an additional normative advantage. Units that begin such a
relationship understanding themselves as representing distinct peoples
might evolve more sense of mutual identification over time because they
interact about problems they face together or establish cooperative
relations around specific issues or interests. Whereas self-determination
understood as state sovereignty and non-interference tends to reinforce
closed and essentialized national identities, self-determination as non-
domination can be more open to change and fusion, as developed
voluntarily by people who live and work in close proximity.
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The conception of self-determination as non-domination applies in
principle, in my view, to the entire world. It implies that sovereignty as non-
interference is not the appropriate principle for any of the world’s peoples,
and thus implies that the existing states of the world, as well as peoples
claiming self-determination but who do not have states, ought to develop
more integrated institutions of cooperation both at local, regional and
global levels. Self-determination as non-domination can be fully insti-
tutionalized in one place only if it is institutionalized in others.
A scenario of self-determination as non-domination for Jews, Palestinians,
and others in Palestine/Israel thus cannot be isolated from an imagined
future for the wider Middle East region. The state of Israel that defines
itself as a Jewish state currently exercises inexcusable domination of
Palestinians both inside Israel and in the occupied territories. When we
widen the lens to include the entire mid-east region, however, it is the
Jewish people who appear vulnerable to domination by an Arab majority.
The fates of all the peoples in the region are necessarily linked by factors
such as environmental conditions and economic interaction. Stable insti-
tutions of self-determination for both Jews and Palestinians in this region
ultimately would seem to require establishing federated institutions of
conflict resolution and cooperative action among several of the now existing
states in the region together with a reconfigured set of autonomous units in
Palestine/Israel.22 Regional autonomy in such wider federated relationships
would have to support the autonomy and prosperity of predominantly
Jewish self-governing units alongside predominantly Arab ones.
The question of the right of Palestinians displaced in the way that created
Israel to return to their homelands is difficult for any of these three options
to face. It is perhaps the least vexing for the singular-state alternative. Any
institutional arrangement for the future of Palestine/Israel should recognize
the Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and in the occupied territories
who were, or whose parents and grandparents were, forced out of their
homes. I have no wisdom to offer here about what this should mean in
practice. Insofar as a vision of horizontal federalism might and should be
extended beyond Palestine/Israel to the entire mid-east region, however
(as well as in principle to other parts of the world), self-determination
as non-domination might also offer resources to imagine ways that
Palestinian refugees can claim their rights of relationship to other dispersed
Palestinians.
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this article has been to explain and defend the
moral value of a conception of self-determination as relational autonomy
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or non-domination, as against the still more accepted principle of self-
determination as non-interference. Because of the dense interrelation of
Palestinian and Jewish peoples in the lands of Palestine/Israel, I find this
conception particularly apt here for trying to imagine alternative insti-
tutional possibilities. Conflicts among peoples all over the world, however,
often involve similar spatial and economic interdependence that require
imagination of autonomy without separation. Most of these proximities,
and unequal relations of interdependence, also result from histories of
unjust domination that should be recognized, but cannot be completely
undone. The question is now how to afford peoples, who consider them-
selves distinct, self-determination while limiting their ability to dominate
others and enabling their ability to cooperate.
The alternative I have imagined for Palestine/Israel is not a political
proposal. Political actors involved in the conflict themselves must develop
those. Despite the rigidity of some leaders and other political actors both
inside and outside the region – and not least the leaders of my government,
the US – there is nevertheless hope for change because both Palestinian
and Israeli participants in civil society have been working across the divide
to try to offer new possibilities for peace.
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Notes
1 I take this phrase from my essay, ‘Together in Difference: Transforming the
Logic of Group Political Conflict,’ first published in Will Kymlicka, ed, The
Rights of Minority Cultures (1995). See also my book Inclusion and Democracy
(2000), Chapter 6, for an articulation of a model of local governance among
differentiated but not exclusive groups, which there I call ‘differentiated
solidarity’. Compare the idea of differentiation in togetherness that Julie
Mostov refers to as ‘soft borders’ (2003).
2 I discuss the claims of indigenous people in more detail and the concept of self-
determination that I think best corresponds to this claim in my essay, ‘Two
Concepts of Self-determination,’ (2001). See also discussions of indigenous
politics in Keal, 2003; Williams, 1999; Wilmer, 1993.
3 For on articulate expression of this position, see Tamir, 1993.
ETHNICITIES 5(2)156
157
4 Jacob Levy points out that theorists of multiculturalism and cultural autonomy
often bracket the question of land rights; see Levy, 2000, Chapters 6 and 7.
5 Amal Jamal, ‘Politicizing Indigeneity: On the Morality of Arab Collective
Rights in Israel’ (n.d.).
6 I develop this account of self-determination in earlier writing. See ‘Two
Concepts of Self-determination,’ (2001) and Inclusion and Democracy (2000),
Chapter 7.
7 Okin, 1999.
8 I derive the distinction between self-determination as non-interference and as
non-domination from Philip Pettit, Republicanism (1997); Pettit’s theory
concerns freedom for individuals only; I extend the distinction to conceptual-
ize autonomy for peoples.
9 Elazar, 1987: 12. For additional conceptual accounts of federalism, see
Guibernau, 1999; Smith, 1995.
10 Requejo, 2001: 182.
11 Requejo, 2001: 182.
12 Elazar, ‘Autonomy in a Post-statist World, introduction to Elazar, 1982; see also
Elazar, 1987, Chapter 2.
13 Compare Baubock’s (2003) ‘Political Boundaires in a Multilevel Democracy’.
14 See Frug, 2001, Chapter 6.
15 The discussion that follows of problems with most versions of the two-state
solution has benefited from reading the ‘Proposal for an Alternative
Configuration in Palestine-Israel’ (Alternative Palestine Agenda, n.d.),
www.ap-agenda.org, accessed 4 October 2003.
16 For details on the situation of Palestinian minority in Israel, Adalah, 1998;
Rouhana, 1997; Sultany, 2003; Yonah and Saporta, 2002.
17 For example, Abummah, 2003; Da’Na, 2001; Freidman, 2003; Khalidi, 2003;
Lazare, 2003; Rabkin, 2003. While he refers to his alternative as binational,
Tony Judt’s vision appears to me of a singular, secular, individualist state; see
Judt, 2003; my reading leads me to think that two different visions come under
the general label of ‘binationalism’ in current discussions about the future of
Palestine/Israel, corresponding to two of the alternatives I state here, one a
singular state, the other a more federated conception. Responses to Judt by
Omer Bartov, Abraham Foxman, Amos Elon and Michael Walzer appear in the
New York Review of Books, 50(19).
18 See, for example, Esteron’s critical response to Judt’s article (2003).
19 Alternative Palestinian Agenda (n.d.).
20 Yiftachel, 2003, Chapter 13, ‘Proposal for a Bi-national Capital Region for
Jerusalem/Al-Quds’.
21 The Alternative Palestinian Agenda’s ‘Proposal for an Alternative Configur-
ation in Palestine-Israel’ (n.d.) contains thought-through details about discon-
tiguous jurisdictions and how they might relate to one another. In one of his
columns arguing against the idea of separate sovereign states of Palestine and
Israel, Edward Said mentioned that enactment of a right of self-determination
for the groups might best be realized in ‘federated cantons,’ but he gave no
details (Said, 1999).
22 Jeff Halper (2002) argues for region-wide confederated system in the Middle
East that might function like the European Union; individuals would hold
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citizenship in one unit, for example, but be able to move freely among and
reside in other units.
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